Anti-Money Laundering

Proceeds of Crime Act 2002

The Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA), as amended by the Criminal Finances Act 2017 (CFA) (see question 2), establishes three principal substantive money laundering offences (the primary offences):

• concealing, disguising, converting or transferring proceeds of crime, or removing the proceeds of crime from the jurisdiction (ie, England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland) (section 327);
• entering into, or becoming concerned in, an arrangement that one knows or suspects enables the retention, use or control of the proceeds of crime by or on behalf of another person (section 328); and
• acquiring, using or possessing proceeds of crime (section 329).

Section 340(3) POCA defines proceeds of crime as property that constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct or represents such a benefit (whether in whole or part and whether directly or indirectly); and the alleged offender knows or suspects it represents such a benefit. Conduct is criminal if it constitutes an offence in any part of the UK; or would constitute an offence in the UK if it occurred in the UK. See question 12 for POCA’s extra-territorial jurisdiction.

It is a defence to the primary offences where an authorised disclosure has been made to the National Crime Agency (NCA) and appropriate consent has been received. For details of this defence, see question 8.

In addition to the primary offences, POCA also creates certain secondary offences that distinguish between corporates and individuals operating within and outside the regulated sector (the former being subject to more onerous obligations).

Regulated sector

The regulated sector comprises:

• credit institutions;
• financial institutions;
• auditors, insolvency practitioners, external accountants and tax advisers;
• independent legal professionals;
• trust or company service providers;
• estate agents;
• high-value dealers; and
• casinos.

Under section 330 POCA, a person in the regulated sector commits an offence if:

• they know or suspect, or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, that another person is engaged in money laundering;
• the information or other matter on which their knowledge or suspicion is based, or that gives reasonable grounds for such knowledge or suspicion, came to them in the course of a business in the regulated sector; and
• they do not disclose their knowledge or suspicion to a nominated officer (usually the money laundering reporting officer within their company) or to the NCA.

Under section 331 POCA, a nominated officer within the regulated sector also commits an offence if he or she fails to pass to the NCA disclosures received under section 330 POCA where he or she knows or suspects, or has reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting, money laundering.

There are also offences associated with tipping off others as to the existence of a money laundering disclosure or any investigation that may result from that disclosure, in circumstances where such a disclosure is likely to prejudice the investigation (section 333A POCA). It is a defence that the person did not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to cause prejudice (sections 333D(3) and 333D(4) POCA).

It is also important to note that under paragraph 23, Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (CCA), in England & Wales and Northern Ireland the primary offences and sections 330 and 333A POCA qualify as offences in relation to which a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) may be entered into (with the important caveat that DPAs are available to corporates and not individuals). DPAs are not currently available in Scotland, but the House of Lords’ recent report on the Bribery Act 2010 invited the Scottish government to consider adopting a system analogous to the DPA regime.

Non-regulated sector

In respect of the non-regulated sector, the ‘failure to report’ offence under POCA (section 332) only applies to nominated officers (not other employees) and then only if a number of conditions are satisfied. Of particular note, liability for failing to make an authorised report to the NCA cannot arise unless the nominated officer has actual knowledge or suspicion of money laundering. This is in contrast to the regulated sector, where liability can also arise where there are ‘reasonable grounds’ for knowledge or suspicion.

Persons within both the non-regulated sector and regulated sectors can also be guilty of an offence under section 342 POCA if they disclose their knowledge or suspicion of an investigation in circumstances where the disclosure is likely to prejudice it; or by falsifying, concealing, destroying or otherwise disposing of relevant documents (or causing another to do so). This provision is considerably broader than section 333A POCA as there is no requirement for the information about the investigation to have been gained by the individual in the course of business. It is a defence that the person did not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to cause prejudice (section 342(3) POCA) or did not know or suspect that documents were relevant to an investigation or did not intend to conceal the relevant facts disclosed in the documents (section 342(6) POCA).

The Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017 (the Regulations)

The Regulations came into force on 26 June 2017, replacing the Money Laundering Regulations 2007 and the Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2007 (together the Old Regulations). The Regulations apply to the conduct and transactional work of ‘relevant persons’ (a term that, in practice, is identical to the regulated sector).

In summary, the Regulations require companies to conduct thorough risk assessments in each part of their business, identifying AML vulnerabilities and establishing and maintaining policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively those risks. Such policies, controls and procedures must be risk-based, proportionate to the size and nature of the business, approved by senior management and subject to adequate record-keeping practices. These include adequate client due diligence (CDD) measures when establishing a business relationship, when conducting occasional transactions (subject to certain criteria, see Regulation 27), when there are suspicions of money laundering or when there are doubts as to the veracity or adequacy of identification documents previously obtained. See question 17 for further details.

Failure to abide by these requirements is a criminal offence. The Regulations also create offences relating to prejudicing or obstructing investigations and inappropriately disclosing details about investigations. These sit alongside an offence of contravening a prohibition on being a beneficial owner, officer or manager of a relevant firm. The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) or HM Revenue & Customs (HMRC) may also impose a civil financial penalty of such amount as they consider appropriate or publish a statement censuring the person in breach.

The Serious Crime Act 2015

Section 37 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 (which came into force on 1 June 2015) introduced, via amendment to POCA, an exclusion of civil liability arising from good-faith authorised disclosures of suspicion of money laundering. This amendment was necessary as firms found themselves increasingly defending civil actions in circumstances where they had made an authorised disclosure following suspicion of money laundering and were then forced to freeze customer accounts (or at least limit access to funds) until the relevant enforcement body decided whether to take further action or consent to resume ordinary operations, causing loss to their clients.

The Terrorism Act 2000

The Terrorism Act 2000 creates separate offences of funding terrorism, using money or property for terrorism or entering any arrangement that makes funds available for the purposes of terrorism (sections 15-17). In addition, it is an offence to enter into, or become concerned in, an arrangement that facilitates the retention or control by, or on behalf of, another person, of terrorist property in any way (section 18). Similarly to POCA, it also produces separate offences of failure to disclose the laundering of terrorist property or of ‘tipping off’ a third party that a disclosure had been made.

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018

The Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, which received Royal Assent on 23 May 2018, is designed to smooth the transition following the UK’s exit from the European Union (Brexit). It does so by ensuring that post-Brexit the UK can continue to impose, update and lift sanctions provided for by the UN and pursuant to other international obligations, and to effectively detect and prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, including by implementing internationally recognised standards (as set down by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)).

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POCA provides a number of investigatory and enforcement tools to enable the authorities and the courts to detect, prevent and disrupt economic crime. Of particular note are the following.

Restraint 0rders (RO)

Sections 40 and 41 POCA grant authorities in England & Wales the right to apply to the Crown Court for an RO, which restrains or freezes a person’s assets, in circumstances where that person is under investigation for an offence and there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the alleged offender has benefitted from criminal conduct. An application for an RO can be made as soon as a criminal investigation has commenced. The same powers are available to the Crown Court in Northern Ireland under sections 189 and 190 POCA, and to the Court of Session and Sheriff Court in Scotland under sections 119 and 120 POCA. ROs are typically accompanied by disclosure requirements on those subject to the restraint, requiring them to provide information about, for example, their assets and past transactions. Such disclosures cannot, however, be directly used in criminal proceedings against the subject of the RO.

Production orders (PO)

Section 345 POCA enables authorities to apply to court for a PO to compel production of specified material in the context of a broad range of investigations (including money laundering, confiscation and civil recovery). Any application must identify a person or property that is subject to an investigation, and must also state that the PO is sought for the purposes of, and the respondent appears to be in possession of material relating to, the investigation. The default time limit for production is seven days, but this can be lengthened or shortened by the court as it deems appropriate. Failure to comply with a PO is treated as a contempt of court. Section 380 POCA allows a Procurator Fiscal of the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service (COPFS) and the Scottish Ministers in Scotland to apply to the Sheriff for a PO.

Disclosure orders (DO)

Section 357 POCA enables authorities to apply to court for a DO, which compels persons to answer questions, provide specific information or produce documents to an investigator. Failure to comply with a DO is a summary offence (punishable by up to six months imprisonment, a £5,000 fine, or both). Knowingly or recklessly making a false or misleading statement in response to a DO is triable either way (punishable on summary conviction by up to six months’ imprisonment, a £5,000 fine (£10,000 in Scotland), or both; or on indictment by up to two years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both). Previously only available in the context of civil recovery and confiscation investigations, from 31 January 2018 the CFA amended POCA to extend DOs to money laundering investigations (section 357(2) POCA). In Scotland, section 391 POCA enables the Lord Advocate (criminal) to make an application to the High Court of Justiciary, or the Scottish Ministers (civil) to the Court of Session.

Unexplained wealth orders (UWO)

UWOs have been available since 31 January 2018. The purpose of UWOs is to require individuals that fall under suspicion of criminal activity to explain the origins of their property or risk forfeiture. An application for a UWO may be made to the High Court in England & Wales or Northern Ireland, or the Court of Session in Scotland, with or without notice to the respondent. The relevant court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the known source of the respondent’s lawfully obtained income was insufficient to enable the respondent to obtain the property in question (which must be more than £50,000 in value). The authority seeking the UWO must demonstrate those reasonable grounds on the balance of probabilities. If the respondent fails to do so, the property is presumed to be recoverable under any subsequent civil recovery proceedings. Interim freezing orders may also be sought to prevent any civil recovery order obtained as a result of a UWO being frustrated. See National Crime Agency v Hajiyeva [2018] EWHC 2534 (Admin) for an example of recent enforcement action in this area.

Account freezing orders (AFO) and account forfeiture notices (AFN)

As indicated above, POCA provides for the search, seizure, detention and forfeiture of cash (including notes and coins in any currency, postal orders, cheques and bearer shares - in all cases with a value of £1,000 or more). AFO and AFN extend these powers to bank account balances exceeding £1,000. Applications for an AFO are made to the magistrates’ court in England and Wales and Northern Ireland and the Sheriff Court in Scotland. The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that money held in the account (whether in whole or part) is either property obtained through, or intended for use in, unlawful conduct. The AFO can be made for up to two years. Once made, the AFO must be notified to persons affected by it.

For as long as an account is subject to an AFO, the authorities in England and Wales and Northern Ireland can issue an AFN to forfeit the credit balance without a court order, or apply to court for a forfeiture order (in Scotland, forfeiture is only available via a court order). Again, the authorities or court must be satisfied that the funds are recoverable property or intended for use in unlawful conduct. If there is no objection to an AFN, the bank must transfer the amount specified in the AFN to the authority. If, however, the respondent objects within 30 days, the AFN will lapse and the authority will need to apply to court for a forfeiture order (which may be contested).

See also question 10 for further details on the authorities’ power to obtain civil recovery orders in the context of money laundering investigations.

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In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, money laundering offences are principally investigated by the police, NCA and HMRC. Where the alleged money laundering has been committed by an institution based in the financial centre of the City of London, it will generally be investigation by the Money Laundering Investigations Unit, which sits within the Financial Investigations Unit of the City of London Police. If the matter relates to money laundering by PEPs, it will be investigated by a specialist unit within the NCA (the International Corruption Unit).

The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in England and Wales, or the Public Prosecution Services in Northern Ireland, will tend to take over carriage of the matter if it proceeds to prosecution. In cases where the money laundering is linked to a serious fraud or corruption case, particularly with an international element; however, the matter may be both investigated and prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO).

In Scotland criminal investigations are undertaken by the Police Service of Scotland (commonly referred to as Police Scotland) and Scotland’s sole public prosecutor, the COPFS. In Scotland, the delivery of the NCA’s functions is governed by a memorandum of understanding with the Scottish Ministers and with the Lord Advocate’s Office. The Director General of the NCA can designate appropriately qualified NCA officers with the powers of Scottish constables, and the NCA can conduct its own operations in Scotland with the consent of the Lord Advocate.

AML supervisory authorities include HMRC, the FCA and the Gambling Commission, and there are 22 other accountancy and legal professional trade bodies and regulators that act as supervisory authorities, issuing rules to counter AML risks across various sectors.

In addition, in May 2016 the UK government established the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Taskforce (JMLIT). JMLIT comprises both public and private sector institutions and law enforcement agencies, leveraging their experience and expertise to assist in prioritising efforts to tackle financial crime threats.

The Office for Professional Body Anti-Money Laundering Supervision (OPBAS) was also set up in January 2018 to supervise the 22 professional body AML supervisors (including the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Law Society) and ensure that they provide consistently high standards of AML supervision.

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Yes, they can. Corporates are capable of being prosecuted for most criminal offences, unless the statute indicates otherwise. However, to attribute corporate criminal liability for money laundering (a crime that requires mens rea, ie, a guilty mind), the prosecutor must demonstrate that the offence was committed by a natural person (or persons) who was at the time the ‘controlling mind and will’ of the company (this is known as the identification principle). There is a considerable body of case law on who constitutes the ‘controlling mind and will’ of the company (the leading case being Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153). It is accepted that such a person must be sufficiently senior as to be the embodiment of the company when acting on its business.

Given the difficulties that this has often presented prosecutors, the UK government is considering extending the strict liability ‘failure to prevent’ model of corporate criminal liability (currently applicable to bribery or corruption and tax evasion facilitation offences) to other forms of economic crime, including money laundering. Under the proposals, if a corporate’s associated person (a person that performs services for or on behalf of the corporate) commits a money laundering offence, the corporate would be automatically liable. Its only defence would be demonstrating it had reasonable procedures in place to prevent the misconduct. At the time of writing, primary legislation extending this model has not been put before the UK Parliament.

Also note the DPA regime under the CCA, detailed at questions 1 and 10.

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The primary offences under POCA are set out in question 1, with each of sections 327, 328 and 329 POCA requiring that the person knows or suspects that the assets in question are the proceeds of crime.

The threshold for suspicion in this context is very low, the Court of Appeal having held in R v Da Silva [206] EWCA Crim 1654 that a person:

must think that there is a possibility, which is more than fanciful, that the relevant facts exist. A vague feeling of unease would not suffice. But the statute does not require the suspicion to be ‘clear’ or ‘firmly grounded and targeted on specific facts’, or based upon ‘reasonable grounds’.

Section 340(11) POCA also confirms that money laundering includes attempts, conspiracies or incitements to commit an offence under sections 327, 328 or 329 POCA. It similarly includes aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of those offences.

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In general, the answer is no. Section 340(9) POCA defines the proceeds of crime as including money, all property (real or personal) wherever located and whether corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible.

Under section 327(2C), 328(5) and 329(2C) POCA, however, deposit-taking institutions do not commit an offence if they:

• convert or transfer the proceeds of crime;
• enter into or become concerned in an arrangement that they know or suspect facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property by or on behalf of another person; or
• acquires, uses or possesses the proceeds of crime;

so long as they do so in the course of operating an account maintained with them, and the value is less than £250.

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POCA defines predicate offences very broadly.

Part 5 POCA

The term used for predicate offences under Part 5 POCA, which deals with civil recovery of the proceeds of crime, is ‘unlawful conduct’. This is defined at section 241 POCA as conduct that occurs in any part of the UK (ie, England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland) and constitutes an offence in that part. Under section 241(2) POCA, it also extends to conduct that:

• occurs in a country or territory outside the UK and is unlawful under the criminal law of that country or territory; and
• if it occurred in a part of the UK, would be unlawful under the criminal law of that part.

From 31 January 2018, the CFA amended POCA by adding a new provision covering gross human rights abuses (sections 241(2A) and 241A). Specifically, unlawful conduct now includes conduct that:

• occurs in a country or territory outside the UK;
• constitutes, or is connected with, the commission of a gross human rights abuse or violation; and
• if it occurred in a part of the UK, would be an offence triable under the criminal law of that part on indictment only or either on indictment or summarily.

Importantly, in such cases the ‘dual criminality’ requirement under section 241(2) POCA in respect of conduct occurring outside the UK is not required.

Part 7 POCA

The term used for predicate offences under Part 7 POCA, which includes the primary offences and the failure to disclose and tipping-off offences, is ‘criminal conduct’. As indicated at question 1, this is defined at section 340(2) POCA as conduct that constitutes an offence in any part of the UK or would constitute an offence in any part of the UK if it occurred there.

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There are a number of defences to the primary offences (sections 327-329 POCA).

It will be a defence if one of the elements of the offence (eg, if the necessary knowledge or suspicion that the property in question constitutes or represents a benefit from ‘criminal conduct’) is absent.

It will also be a defence if a person makes an authorised disclosure under section 338 POCA (for nominated officers this means submitting suspicious activity reports (SAR) to the NCA, setting out the relevant details of a proposed activity that may involve the commission of a primary offence, and seeking consent from the NCA to proceed). If consent is granted, or the NCA fails to respond within seven working days, there will be a defence against the primary offences. If, however, the NCA does not grant consent it will trigger an initial 31-day ‘moratorium period’ in which the activity must be suspended, allowing the NCA to investigate the matters raised in the SAR. Note that the CFA amended POCA so that now the NCA can apply to court for an extension to the moratorium period for a further 31 days, up to a maximum of 186 days.

A person will also have a defence if they intended to make such a disclosure, but had reasonable excuse for not doing so.

Subject to the gross humans rights abuse amendment introduced by the CFA (see question 7), it will also be a defence to demonstrate that the unlawful conduct was reasonably believed to have taken place outside the UK, was in fact lawful under the criminal law of that jurisdiction at the relevant time, and that, if the conduct had occurred within the UK, the maximum sentence would have been 12 months’ imprisonment or less (Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Money Laundering: Exceptions to Overseas Conduct Defence) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1070)). Certain offences, for example, the general prohibition on performing regulated activities without authorisation or exemption (sections 23 and 25 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000), fall within this exception even if the relevant sentence would have exceeded 12 months.

In addition, a person does not commit an offence under section 329 POCA if they acquire, use or possess the proceeds of crime for ‘adequate consideration’ (ie, where the property has been acquired by a purchaser for a proper market price or similar exchange). However, if it can be shown that the purchaser knows or suspects that its payment may help another to engage in criminal activity, it will not be treated as having paid adequate consideration (section 328(3)(c) POCA).

Also see the deposit-taker exemption detailed at question 6.

There are also defences to the secondary offences of tipping-off (section 333A POCA) and to prejudicing an investigation (section 342 POCA).

The principal defence to a charge of tipping-off is that the person did not know or suspect that a disclosure would likely prejudice an investigation (section 333D(3) and (4) POCA). Other defences include disclosures made by professional advisers to clients to dissuade them from committing a money laundering offence, and disclosures to a person’s client or customer to notify them of an NCA application to extend the moratorium period for investigating suspected money laundering.

Similarly, the principal defence to a charge of prejudicing an investigation is that the person did not know or suspect that a disclosure would prejudice an investigation, or that the documents he or she revealed were relevant to the investigation.

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The primary offences (sections 327-329 POCA) are ‘either way’ offences, meaning that individuals can be tried summarily (with a maximum of six months’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine in England and Wales and Northern Ireland or a fine not exceeding £10,000 in Scotland, or both) or on indictment (with a maximum of 14 years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both).

Corporates similarly face financial penalties on summary conviction or on indictment. They also face mandatory debarment from tendering for public contracts across the UK under Regulation 57(1) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/102) and Regulation 58(1) of the Public Contracts (Scotland) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015/446).

Directors of companies convicted of money laundering offences may also be disqualified from continuing to hold appointments as directors.

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In addition to the various orders set out at question 2 (including restraint, production and disclosure orders), the following should be highlighted.

Confiscation orders

A confiscation order deprives a convicted person of the benefit they gained from their criminal conduct. The order does not actually confiscate any specific property, but rather requires the offender to pay a sum of money representing the value of the benefit received (it is an order in personam rather than in rem). Confiscation orders can only be made in the Crown Court in England & Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Court must disregard any amount of fine or compensation order, victim surcharge order or criminal courts charge that will also be ordered (however, in cases where an offender is unable to pay all orders made against him or her, the Court may prioritise compensation). In Scotland, a confiscation order can be made in the High Court of Justiciary, the Sheriff Appeal Court or the Sheriff Court.

Compensation orders

The Court may also make a compensation order, requiring the offender to restore monies to the victim for losses and damages suffered as a result of the offender’s criminality. In Scotland, victims can be compensated under the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 via a civil claim, and compensation orders may be granted in Northern Ireland under the Criminal Justice (Northern Ireland) Order 1994.

In England and Wales and Northern Ireland the criminal authorities can also apply to the High Court for a civil recovery order (CRO) under Part 5 POCA. Proceedings for CROs in Scotland are taken by the Scottish Ministers (the enforcement authority) in the Court of Session. CROs do not require there to have been a criminal conviction, or even criminal proceedings, against the defendant. Unlike confiscation orders, CROs are made against the property (in rem) rather than the person (in personam). There is a minimum financial threshold of £10,000, and the authorities can seek CROs for property obtained up to 20 years in England and Wales (section 27A Limitation Act 1980), Scotland (section 19B Prescription and Limitation (Scotland) Act 1973) and Northern Ireland (section 72A Limitation (Northern Ireland) Order 1989), before proceedings are issued.

Under the CCA’s DPA regime referenced at question 1, a DPA may require the corporate to disgorge any profits from its alleged offending, to compensate victims or to donate money to a charity or other third party (paragraph 5, Schedule 17 CCA). Depending on the circumstances of the case, a DPA may therefore offer a potential alternative to civil recovery orders.

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There are no limitation periods under the UK’s criminal AML laws, and the authorities can prosecute at any time after an offence has been committed. Offences committed prior to POCA coming into force will be subject to previous legislation.

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As indicated at question 1, conduct is criminal if it constitutes an offence in any part of the UK; or would constitute an offence in the UK if it occurred in the UK.

The courts have held that the primary offences (sections 327-329 POCA) have extraterritorial effect (see R v Rogers [2014] EWCA Crim 1680 in which the court held that the wording of the statute indicated that it had extraterritorial application and that, if it was wrong, the principle set down in R v Smith (Wallace Duncan) (No. 4) applied in any event (ie, provided some substantial element of the money laundering offence takes place within the UK, and provided there is no offence to international comity, the court had jurisdiction)).

However, as described at question 8, the primary offences have no extraterritorial effect in cases where:

• the person knows, or believes on reasonable grounds, that the relevant criminal conduct occurred outside the UK;
• the predicate offence was not unlawful under the criminal law then applicable in that jurisdiction; and
• had it taken place in the UK, the predicate offence would not have been punishable by more than 12 months’ imprisonment (see the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (Money Laundering: Exceptions to Overseas Conduct Defence) Order 2006 (SI 2006/1070)).

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For the purposes of criminal enforcement, the same authorities as listed in question 3 will maintain responsibility for investigation and enforcement. However, with regard to the regulated sector the Regulations require each of the covered institutions and persons to have a supervisory authority (for example, the FCA for financial service businesses or the Solicitors Regulation Authority for solicitors). It is the duty of these supervisory authorities to effectively monitor and take other appropriate measures to ensure compliance with the Regulations (under the auspices of OPBAS). Regulators will carry out periodic reviews of the systems and controls of firms operating in the regulated sector and can take enforcement action (including fines and prohibitions) for breaches.

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As indicated at question 1, the AML measures required under the Regulations only apply to individuals and entities operating in the regulated sector. Those operating outside the regulated sector may nevertheless consider implementing analogous measures if they face significant AML risks.

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UK AML legislation requires regulated sector businesses to implement relatively extensive compliance programmes. These programmes include:

• appointing a nominated officer;
• establishing and maintaining policies, controls and procedures to mitigate and manage effectively the risks of money laundering identified in any risk assessment undertaken by the company (such policies, procedures and controls being proportionate to the size and nature of the business, and including risk management practices, internal controls, client due diligence (CDD), record-keeping, staff training and ongoing monitoring); and
• identifying and scrutinising AML red flags and, where new technology is adopted, to take appropriate measures in preparation for, and during, its implementation so as to assess and if necessary mitigate any money laundering risks this new technology may cause.

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See question 1 for details of the offences under POCA and the Regulations.

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In the UK, CDD is required by those working in the regulated sector when:

• a business relationship is established;
• the intention is to carry out an occasional transaction:
• that amounts to a transfer of funds within the meaning of article 3.9 of the Funds Transfer Regulation (2015/847) exceeding €1,000; or
• that amounts to €15,000 or more, whether executed in a single operation or in several operations that appear to be linked;
• money laundering or terrorism financing is suspected; or
• there are doubts over the veracity or adequacy of documents or information previously obtained for identification.

CDD should always be applied on a risk-sensitive basis and be sufficient to demonstrate that the extent of the measures taken is appropriate in all the circumstances. As a minimum, CDD consists of:

• identifying the customer and verifying their identity on the basis of documents or information obtained from a reliable and independent source;
• identifying the customer’s beneficial owner (since 6 April 2016 most UK entities have been required to maintain beneficial ownership or persons with significant control registers and submit this information to Companies House for inclusion on its public website); and
• obtaining information on the intended purpose of the business relationship.

Under the Regulations, a beneficial owner is any individual that:

• with the exception of a listed company on a regulated market, ultimately owns or controls, either directly or indirectly, more than 25 per cent of the shares or voting rights in the customer; or
• exercises control over the management of the corporate.

Similar rules apply in relation to partnerships, trusts and other legal entities or arrangements.

This process must be completed before the business relationship commences, save where this would interrupt the normal conduct of business and there is little risk of money laundering or terrorism financing, in which case it can be completed during the establishment of the business relationship. Where it is not possible to complete the CDD satisfactorily, transactions should not be undertaken and the relationship should be terminated. In such circumstances, businesses might consider whether a disclosure under POCA is also required.

Ongoing monitoring is required on all business relationships, and should again be applied on a risk-sensitive basis. This involves scrutiny of transactions throughout the course of the relationship to ensure they are consistent with the existing knowledge of the customer, his or her business and risk profile, together with keeping other information obtained for CDD measures up to date.

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The Regulations

Under the Regulations, regulated sector businesses are required to carry out a written risk assessment to identify and assess the risks of money laundering and terrorism financing to their business, taking a number of factors into account. These include, at Regulation 18:

• guidance and other information issued by a relevant supervisory authority;
• assessments of the business’s customers;
• the countries or geographic areas in which the business operates;
• products or services;
• transactions; and
• delivery channels.

In deciding what particular steps are appropriate, the size and nature of the business should be taken into consideration. Up-to-date records should also be maintained, setting out the steps the business has taken to assess its risk.

The Regulations embed a risk-based approach into CDD, with standard, simplified and enhanced levels based on the assessed money laundering and terrorist financing risk. Note that unlike the Old Regulations, there is no automatic simplified due diligence for clients or matters that present a low money laundering risk. The Regulations rather include a non-exhaustive list of factors that should be used to assess the risk (see Regulation 37). Examples of situations where enhanced due diligence is required are where there is a high money laundering risk, where the customer is a politically exposed person (PEP) or where the proposed transaction is complex, unusually large or lacking in apparent economic or legal rationale.

The Regulations’ definition of PEPs includes domestic as well as foreign individuals who are entrusted with prominent public functions, including heads of state, high-level judges, senior diplomats and managers and directors of state-owned enterprises. Immediate family members and close associates of such persons will also be caught. In such cases, there must, as a minimum, be senior management approval for establishing the business relationship, with adequate measures to identify source of funds and enhanced ongoing monitoring. Regulation 35(9) confirms that even if someone ceases to be a PEP, enhanced CDD requirements will still be applicable for at least 12 months after that point. It also states that businesses might consider extending this if appropriate to address money laundering or terrorist financing risks.

In addition, the Regulations state that no credit institution may enter into, or continue, a correspondent banking relationship with a shell bank and that the credit institution must take appropriate measures to ensure that it does not enter into or continue a banking relationship with a bank that is known to permit its accounts to be used by a shell bank.

Second Wire Transfer Regulation (EU) 2016/847 (WTR2)

WTR2 has direct effect in the European Economic Area (EEA) and, at the time of writing, still applies to the UK. It requires financial institutions to ensure that all wire transfers include information about the payer, such as the name, address and account number of the payer, as well as the name and account number of the payee (or, where there is no account, a unique transaction identifier), although there are reduced requirements if all payment service providers in the payment chain are established in the EEA.

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Record-keeping

The Regulations require that a person in the regulated sector must keep the following for five years:

• a copy of any documents and information obtained by the relevant person to satisfy CDD requirements; or
• sufficient supporting records in respect of a business relationship or occasional transactions that is the subject of CDD measures or ongoing monitoring.

In either case, the five years runs from the point at which the business relationship ends or, where the records were only in relation to an occasional transaction, the date on which the occasional transaction is completed.

The Regulations also require that any personal data in the CDD information and transaction data must be deleted after a maximum of 10 years unless certain exclusions apply (eg, if the personal data is required in court proceedings, or where the data subject has given consent to the data being retained).

On a practical level, it would also be sensible for the nominated officer to keep a detailed record of any money laundering issues, including any internal disclosures they receive, any external disclosures subsequently made to the NCA (or if no report was produced, a detailed note as to why) and any correspondence with the NCA or other investigation or enforcement.

The record-keeping obligations also apply to foreign branches and subsidiaries where local law allows.

Reporting requirements

As indicated at question 1, there are a number of reporting requirements under POCA that can broadly be broken down into the requirement for:

• a person working in the regulated sector who, during the course of business, comes to suspect another individual is involved in money laundering, to make a disclosure to a nominated officer (section 330 POCA); and
• a nominated officer who receives a disclosure about the possibility of money laundering, to make a disclosure to the NCA (sections 331 and 332 POCA).

In Northern Ireland, it should be noted that, pursuant to section 5 Criminal Law Act (Northern Ireland) 1967, there is a positive duty to report certain offences if an individual ‘knows or believes’ that ‘a relevant offence’ has been committed (ie, an offence carrying a term of five years’ imprisonment (or more) or a fixed sentence), and he or she has information that is likely to secure, or be of material assistance to securing the apprehension, prosecution or conviction of any person. It is a criminal offence not to make the report (with sentences on indictment dependent on the gravity of the ‘relevant offence’). The information should be given to a police officer within a reasonable time unless there is reasonable excuse. It shall not be an offence if a person has suffered loss by reason of the offence and has been reasonably compensated, so long as it was not a condition of the compensation not to report the matter.

In Scotland, there is a separate legal duty under section 31 of the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010 to report to Police Scotland knowledge or suspicion, arising in the course of business, that two or more people have agreed to commit an indictable offence (for example, bribery, money laundering or other financial crimes).

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Prior to 25 May 2018, the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA98) governed the processing of personal data in the UK. The General Data Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679) (GDPR), which has direct effect across the EEA, superseded the DPA on that date. Although at the time of writing the terms of the UK’s exit from the EU remain unclear, the UK government has indicated that GDPR-consistent principles will continue to govern the UK’s data protection regime post-exit.

The Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA18) also came into force on 25 May 2018, covering the processing of personal data:

• within and outside the scope of GDPR;
• by competent authorities for law enforcement purposes; and
• by the intelligence services.

GDPR and DPA18 require personal data to be processed in accordance with prescribed principles (article 5 GDPR) and a lawful basis for processing has to be established (article 6 GDPR) to enable the processing of personal data to take place; this includes when conducting CDD. Subject to certain exclusions, data subjects also have the right to know how their data will be handled and with whom it will be shared. This is usually achieved through the publishing of a ‘privacy statement’. The principles within the legislation also dictate that information should only be kept for as long as necessary, and used in a way that is consistent with why it is held. When conducting due diligence, careful consideration should be given to the volume and extent of personal data that is shared (for example, can it be given in an anonymised form) and whether any additional steps need to be taken before it is shared with a third party.

Personal data should not be transferred outside the EEA, unless adequate protections are in place; to do so will be a breach and could lead to fines of up to €20 million or four per cent of global turnover (whichever is higher). Such protections can be put in place through a range of mechanisms, such as standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules or if the country to which the data is being transferred is deemed ‘adequate’ (including USA (under Privacy Shield only), New Zealand, Japan (private sector organisations only) and Canada (commercial organisations only).

Pursuant to article 10 of GDPR, there is an express restriction on personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences.

Section 10(5) DPA18 confirms that processing personal data relating to criminal convictions and offences will only comply with article 10 GDPR if it meets certain conditions. These conditions include where the processing is necessary for the purpose of making a disclosure in good faith under section 339ZB POCA. Briefly, subject to certain conditions, section 339ZB POCA enables a regulated sector business to request information about a suspected money launderer from another regulated sector business, thus assisting the requesting party in its enquiries. Other exceptions include when processing is necessary for preventing or detecting unlawful acts (paragraph 10, Schedule 1 DPA18) or complying with or assisting other persons to comply with a regulatory requirement that involves taking steps to establish whether a person has committed unlawful act or has been involved in dishonesty, malpractice or seriously improper conduct (paragraph 12, Schedule 1 DPA18). However, to rely on these exemptions, an appropriate policy document must be in place.

Also, if personal data is being processed by a processor on behalf of a controller (for example, through a datasite), there are mandatory contractual clauses that need to be in place between the parties to ensure that sufficient safeguards are in place in protect personal data.

Separately, POCA contains certain set circumstances in which regulated sector businesses can share records or information without committing a tipping-off offence. These are predominantly contained at sections 333B-333E, and include sharing information with an employee, officer or partner of the same undertaking; or to a supervisory body for the purposes of preventing or investigating a criminal offence.

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POCA offences

For resolutions and sanctions in relation to the primary offences (sections 327-329), see questions 9 and 10.

Like the primary offences, breach of the secondary offences of failing to disclose, tipping-off and prejudicing an investigation can be tried summarily or on indictment.

Sections 330, 331 and 332 POCA (failing to disclose): six months imprisonment, an unlimited fine in England and Wales or a fine not exceeding £10,000 in Scotland or £5,000 in Northern Ireland, or both on summary conviction; five years’ imprisonment, unlimited fine, or both, on indictment.

There is also a technical summary-only offence under section 339(1A) POCA that relates to making a disclosure otherwise than in a ‘prescribed form’ without reasonable excuse. The offence carries a maximum fine of £5,000. There is currently no prescribed form, although the NCA’s preferred method is the SAR tool on its website: https://www.ukciu.gov.uk/(w5yetpm3s1y5zgyzo0bfac45)/saronline.aspx.

Section 333A POCA (tipping-off): three months’ imprisonment, fine not exceeding £5000, or both on summary conviction; two years’ imprisonment, unlimited fine, or both, on indictment.

Section 342 POCA (prejudicing an investigation): six months’ imprisonment, unlimited fine in England and Wales or a fine not exceeding £10,000 in Scotland or £5,000 in Northern Ireland, or both on summary conviction; five years’ imprisonment, unlimited fine, or both on indictment.

The Regulations

Following a breach of the Regulations, the designated supervisory authority for the business can impose a penalty of such amount as it considers appropriate. However, it shall not take action where there are reasonable grounds to show that the individual took all reasonable steps to comply with the requirement.

As indicated at question 1, it is also a criminal offence to breach a ‘relevant requirement’ under the Regulations. Relevant requirements include performing risk assessments and CDD, and refraining from undertaking activities (including business relationships and occasional transactions) unless the proper policies and procedures are in place and followed. They also include complying with investigations launched by supervisory authorities and compliance with civil penalties and sanctions. These sit alongside an offence of contravening a prohibition on being a beneficial owner, officer or manager of a relevant firm

Regulation 92 confirms that officers of a corporate can be guilty of an offence where an offence has been committed by the corporate with the consent or connivance of the officer, or where the offence is attributable to the officer’s lack of supervision or control.

In England & Wales, on summary conviction, the maximum sentence is three months’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both (the maximum fine in Scotland is £10,000 and Northern Ireland is £5,000). On indictment, the maximum sentence is two years’ imprisonment, an unlimited fine, or both.

It will be a defence to show that the person took all reasonable steps to avoid committing the offence.

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There are no limitation periods in relation to AML-related criminal offences in the UK, and a prosecution can be brought at any time after the offence is committed.

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The Regulations apply to those in the regulated sector that carry on business in the UK. The extent to which the Regulations apply to foreign-regulated businesses is therefore limited to their UK operations; the Regulations do not generally apply to overseas business. However, as discussed above, to the extent permitted by local law, the Regulations impose an obligation on financial institutions to require its non-EEA branches and subsidiaries to comply with measures equivalent to those set out in the Regulations (including CDD measures, ongoing monitoring and record-keeping).

For the extra-territorial reach of POCA offences, see questions 1 and 12.

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In England and Wales and Northern Ireland, civil claims may be brought against money launderers and potentially also against those that assist them by three routes: knowing or unconscionable receipt; dishonest assistance; and conspiracy by unlawful means.

Liability for knowing or unconscionable receipt arises where the defendant knows that they have received assets in breach of the trust or fiduciary arrangement under which they were held.

Liability for dishonest assistance requires the defendant to have dishonestly procured, induced or assisted a breach of a trust or fiduciary relationship.

Liability for unlawful conspiracy requires a combination or understanding between two or more people, an intention to injure another individual or entity, concerted action, consequent upon the combination or understanding and use of unlawful means as part of the concerted action that results in damage to the target of the conspiracy.

Similarly, in Scotland, damages claims can be raised against criminal offenders in the civil courts to recover certain losses suffered.

In certain circumstances, private individuals, companies or organisations not acting on behalf of the police, CPS or other public prosecuting authority, may also choose to bring a private prosecution. The right to bring a private prosecution in England and Wales is preserved by section 6(1) of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 (POA) and is subject to a number of important conditions (the Crown Prosecution Service may, for example, decide to take over the private prosecution and either continue or, if it believes there is insufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction and/or a prosecution is not in the public interest, discontinue the proceedings). In Scotland, private prosecutions must be commenced by submitting of a Bill of Criminal Letters to the High Court of Justiciary, which decides whether or not the private prosecution can proceed. In Northern Ireland, an application is made to a lay magistrate.

See R v Somaia [2017] EWCA Crim 741, in which the English Court of Appeal confirmed that private prosecutors can institute confiscation and compensation proceedings under POCA (and also the pre-POCA regime under the Criminal Justice Act 1988) following a conviction in the Crown Court. In that case, Mr Somaia was privately prosecuted by a former business associate and convicted of nine counts of obtaining a money transfer by deception.

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The UK has been a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) since 1990. In addition, the UK is a member of a number of other supranational organisations that play a significant role in addressing the issue; for example, the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, the World Customs Organization, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.

In addition, the UK’s NCA is currently hosting the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, an organisation launched in July 2017 that brings together specialist law enforcement officers from multiple agencies around the world to tackle allegations of grand corruption, including the laundering of the proceeds of crime.

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The FATF updated its mutual evaluation report of the UK on 7 December 2018. In summary, the report found that the UK has a ‘robust understanding’ of its money laundering and terrorist financing risks; ‘routinely and aggressively’ identifying, pursuing and prioritising money laundering investigations and prosecutions. The FATF also stated that the UK had significantly strengthened its AML framework in recent years, but found room for improvement (eg, AML cases tended to be of the simpler variety, the vast majority of SARs came from a small number of financial institutions, and the data received by the NCA (as the jurisdiction’s FIU) was not being used to the fullest extent possible.

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The NCA is the UK’s FIU. Its contact details are as follows:

National Crime Agency

Units 1-6, Citadel Place

Tinworth Street

London SE11 5EF

United Kingdom

Tel: +44 370 496 7622 (available 24/7)

communication@nca.x.gsi.gov.uk

The NCA is a member of the Egmont Group, which is made up of a group of over 150 FIUs that work together to tackle international money laundering and terrorism financing via information exchange and the sharing of expertise. Prior to the 2016 Anti-Corruption Summit in London, the UK government announced that it would support the Egmont Group to establish a Centre of Excellence for Financial Intelligence Units to strengthen the technical capabilities and leadership role of these bodies.

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While the UK is party to a number of bilateral and multilateral mutual legal assistance (MLA) treaties, the UK can provide MLA to any country or territory in the world, whether or not that country is able to assist the UK, and whether or not there is a bilateral or multilateral agreement.

Any competent body under the law of the requesting country may issue a request to the UK. This includes a court exercising criminal jurisdiction or a prosecuting authority outside the UK. The request should be in writing, in English and sent to the appropriate central authority (for example, in England and Wales this is the Home Office, save where orders to freeze or confiscate assets are requested, in which case this should be sent to the CPS or the SFO). MLA allows for a wide range of services, including production orders (used to obtain ‘special procedure material’ such as banking evidence and records held by accountants), search and seizure warrants, and restraint and freezing orders. Requests for restraint and confiscation of assets do require dual criminality. For more details, see the UK Home Office Guidance Paper entitled Requests for Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters.

In terms of UK courts making requests of other jurisdictions in the context of criminal investigations and proceedings, the Crime (Overseas Production Orders) Act 2019 received royal assent on 12 February 2019, enabling authorities to apply for overseas production orders (OPO). OPOs compel respondents outside the UK to produce or give access to specified electronic data, with the instrument intended to simplify existing MLA arrangements. OPOs are, however, dependent on there being a ‘designated international cooperation agreement’ with the jurisdiction in which the respondent is based. At the time of writing, there are no such agreements (albeit the UK is currently negotiating with the United States).

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29. Enforcement and compliance

Describe any national trends in criminal money laundering schemes and enforcement efforts. Describe any national trends in AML enforcement and regulation. Describe current best practices in the compliance arena for companies and financial institutions.

The chapter highlights many of the past year’s statutory and regulatory developments and trends relating to AML supervision and enforcement. The following highlights a few of these.

Anti-money laundering supervision and enforcement reform

In January 2019, the NCA confirmed that over 460,000 SARs were submitted in its 2017/18 reporting year, of which around 23,000 requested a defence against money laundering. These led to 52 arrests and nearly £58 million being denied to criminals. With UK banks said to be spending over £5 million per annum on financial crime compliance, however, some commentators have questioned whether the current anti-money laundering supervision and enforcement framework is working.

The UK Parliament’s House of Commons Treasury Select Committee (TSC) indicated that significant reform is required in its March 2019 report ‘Economic Crime - Anti-money laundering supervision and sanctions implementations’. In total, the TSC made 36 recommendations to improve the UK’s response to the threat of economic crime. These included the need to reform the SAR regime, improving the quality and volume of SARs submitted to the NCA and minimising complications caused by delays in the NCA granting consent to financial transactions.

The TSC’s report also acknowledged the FATF updated mutual evaluation review of the UK’s AML controls, published in December 2018. In summary, the FATF found that UK had a robust understanding of its money laundering and terrorist financing risks, with the JMLIT enhancing public or private information sharing and the OPBAS designed to ensure high standards of AML supervision across the 22 bodies for which it is responsible. However, the FATF also found that AML cases tended to be of the simpler variety, the vast majority of SARs came from a small number of financial institutions, and the data received by the NCA (as the UK’s FIU) was not being used to the fullest extent possible.

OPBAS also reported in its March 2019 report ‘Themes from the 2018 OPBAS anti-money laundering supervisory assessments’ that it had found that 91 per cent of relevant professional body supervisors (PBS) were not fully applying a risk-based approach to supervising members (a requirement under the Regulations); and had varying levels of understanding of risks in their sector. OPBAS has asked all PBSs to develop a suitable strategy to address its findings, and will be monitoring how those strategies are implemented.

Criminal enforcement tools

Recent law reforms have added to the powers available to agencies tasked with criminal investigations and prosecutions involving money laundering offences. Two of the more significant developments are:

• UWOs, which the court may grant on application by an authority and which requires the subject to explain how they lawfully obtained their assets (if they fail to do so, the assets are presumed to be recoverable under civil recovery proceedings); and
• AFOs, which extend existing POCA cash forfeiture powers to bank account balances exceeding £1,000 where there are reasonable rounds for suspecting that the money held in the account (in whole or part) is property obtained through, or intended for use in, unlawful conduct.

On 28 February 2018, the NCA announced that it had secured its first UWOs in relation to £22 million of assets that it believed were ultimately owned by a PEP. The court also granted interim freezing orders to restrain the assets. One of the UWOs was directed at Zamira Hajiyeva, wife of the former chairman of the state-owned International Bank of Azerbaijan (who was jailed for 15 years for fraud and embezzlement). Although Ms Hajiyeva challenged the UWO, on 3 October 2018 the High Court ultimately found that the statutory criteria for making the order had been met and dismissed her action (see National Crime Agency v Hajiyeva [2018] EWHC 2534 (Admin)).

Given the NCA’s success, and Director Donald Toon’s statement last year that UWOs were being considered in ‘100s of cases’, there is every chance that we will see more UWOs over the coming year.

AFOs also provide a simpler means for authorities to freeze and ultimately forfeit credit balances in bank accounts. These instruments have been well used over the past 12 months, with the most recent announcements in March 2019 confirming that the NCA had managed to freeze 95 accounts totalling £3.6 million amid suspicions they were being used by third parties to launder proceeds of crime, and the UK SFO had also managed to freeze and forfeit around £1.5 million from a convicted fraudster. These tools are also likely to see continued use over the coming 12 months.

Regulatory supervision

In April 2018, the FCA published its Business Plan for 2018/19, setting out its key priorities for the coming year. The Business Plan identified fraud, scams and AML among its cross-sector priorities. Among the measures taken by the FCA are: regular inspections of the largest financial services firms, as well as other firms that the regulator believes present high money laundering risk; interviewing key personnel in the context of authorisation applications; consumer alerts; and enforcement tools such as business restrictions and regulatory and criminal investigations (see below).

The FCA’s Annual Report and Anti-Money Laundering Report for 2017/18, published in July 2018, confirmed these cross-sector priorities and detailed the results of the FCA’s Systematic AML Programme (a series of deep-dive inquiries into 14 major retail and investments banks in the UK). In summary, the FCA found a general improvement in firms’ AML compliance programmes, but identified a number of key weaknesses; chief among which were insufficiently detailed AML risk assessments and a failure to apply enhanced due diligence for high risk customers (including PEPs).

As indicated at question 3, OPBAS was also created in January 2018 to supervise the UK’s 22 professional body AML supervisors and ensure that they provide consistently high standards of AML supervision.

Regulatory enforcement

Following the enforcement action against Deutsche Bank in 2017, where the FCA levied a £163 million financial penalty for serious shortcomings in the bank’s AML control framework, Canara Bank was fined £896,100 in June 2018 for similarly failing to maintain adequate AML systems. Canara Bank also failed to take sufficient steps to remedy weaknesses identified by the FCA some five years previously.

Senior FCA executives have also indicated in a number of speeches that the regulator has a large number of enforcement cases in the pipeline, including a number of serious AML systems and controls breaches. Although the FCA has acknowledged that the exercise of criminal powers will remain relatively exceptional, with civil or regulatory powers continuing to be the norm, it has indicated that it will not shy from employing the full suite of enforcement remedies available to it.

Current best practice

Current best practice in the compliance arena for companies and financial institutions within the regulated sector is guided by the Money Laundering, Terrorist Financing and Transfer of Funds (Information on the Payer) Regulations 2017, which now includes a requirement to conduct a risk assessment of money laundering and terrorism-financing risks to ensure that they are taking a risk-based approach to AML. With the increasing complexity of regulation, technology is becoming an important element in setting up effective and efficient compliance processes and procedures. The FCA, for example, has highlighted the benefits of using new technologies in AML compliance, and also has a ‘regulatory sandbox’ where businesses can test innovative products, services, business models and delivery mechanisms.

Trends towards ever deeper information sharing between financial crime agencies on an international basis reflect an emphasis on combatting the flow of criminal proceeds across borders. A recent example of such initiatives is the establishment of the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre (IACCC), including agencies from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, the UK and the USA, which has a rotating secretariat and will be hosted by the UK until 2021.

Similarly, the development of structures in the UK and internationally (such as JMLIT), fostering public-private sharing of intelligence on AML threats, underscores that the best compliance programmes adopt a risk-based approach, and continually evolve and improve to combat new challenges posed for anti-money laundering professionals, law enforcement agencies, and others in the legal and compliance community (both in the regulated and non-regulated sectors).

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